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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
T h i s ii|i''|*H "i I involves t w o cases which were consolidated. T h e
principal parties I
Mail

?

I I • two caiu'h

ii. r >I•

i\i

-. . .

Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle w h o w 11 De referred to as
Federal Savings • 1 ri-• !-n;' • Association -^ Logan

• *•

w h o wil] ..* referred to as FI i: s I: Federal
Is a fraud/misrepresentation case in which Loosles a r e Plaintiffs
ni I IF

hi

Foiir'

1,11 1

I !. Ill M I » " K i l l l I

"'

:i i i t h e B o x Elder County District Court
w<-\

n<* referred

M

*

'

. J

aisrepresentation action

The Trial

* Federal i n t he
misrepresentation action
referrer

1990; this Judgment w

e

Summary Judgment.
ill

M l erl

. *ii

independent action against Loosles as Defendants Lu quiet title to
certain watP 1 " ^ights.
Count

This action w a s filed

3ox Elder

. .*
;- q«.

.
actior

.ase N o . 900000129QT was ultimately

consolidate^ - f - :ase N o . 890000213C£

First Federa

August

s

,

^

(

. ? on June ]•

udgment wilj . *- referred

as the Quiet w* + •• ^ judgment.
Referen
References *
VT'
noted

:.hf transcript will be by the letters
emphasis

t• .
1

Tr

followed

*t\.** unless otherwise

Federal against Loosles for a deficiency judgment following a Trust
Deed foreclosure and a misrepresentation and fraud action by
Loosles

against

All

Pro

Real

Estate

Incorporated,

a

Utah

Corporation, Quality Building Incorporation, a Utah Corporation,
and William C. Packer dba Quality Builders, the realtors and
parties involved in Loosles' acquisition by exchange of the real
property hereafter referenced.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Following are the issues presented to this Court for review
and the standard for appellate review for each issue:
1.

Should Loosles' Brief be disregarded, the Trial Court

decisions affirmed and/or the appeal dismissed with prejudice due
to Loosles' failure to comply with Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and to cite to the record in the Brief? The standard for
review is evaluation of the compliance and exercise of discretion
as to sanctions. Uckerman v. Uckerman, 588 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1978).
2.

Did the Trial Court correctly grant First Federal's Motion

For Summary

Judgment

misrepresentation?

(R. pp. 90-93) on Loosles' claims

The Trial Court decided this issue as a matter

of law on undisputed facts.
correctness.

The standard for review is for

Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d

738 (Utah, 1990).
3.

for

Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah, 1989).

Have Loosles met their burden of marshalling the evidence

in support of the Trial Court's decision to quiet title to certain
water rights in favor of First Federal and then showing that such
2

<

*

avorable to the Trial Court's

decision, failed to sustain such decision?
fact and the standard of review

This is a question of

"clearly erroneous" Rule 52[a],

1

— i£— I v „ BMG Corporation, 7"!IU

P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985).

STAT0TE

g jyjp

RULE

g

The following statutes and rules are subject to interpretation
by this Court

appeal:

RuiAll statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall be supported by citations to the record.
Rule 24(a)(9), URAP:
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on, (Emphasis added)•
Rule 24(e), URAP:
References shall be made to the pages of the original
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement
of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g), References to
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is
made to evidence and admissibility of which is i n
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the
transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered,
and received or rejected•
URAP:
Briefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.

3

§ 73-1-11, U.C.A., (1953 as amended):
A right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall
pass to the grantee of such land, andf in cases where
such right has been exercised in irrigating different
parcels of land at different times, such right shall pass
to the grantee of any parcel of land on which such right
was exercised next preceding the time of the execution of
any conveyance thereof; . . . provided that any such
right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may be
reserved by the grantor in any such conveyance by making
such reservation in express terms in such conveyance
S 78-12-26, U.C.A., (1953, as amended):
Within three years:
(3)
mistake;
does not
party of

An action for relief on the ground of fraud or
except that the cause of action in such case
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

Rule 52(a), URCP:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially ... Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
1-7)

On or about May 4, 1989, Loosles filed a Complaint (R. pp.

against Defendants First Federal and Hillam Abstracting

claiming misrepresentation by First Federal and seeking to enjoin
a

foreclosure sale by First Federal and Hillam against real

property owned by Loosle and pledged by Trust Deed to First Federal
as Beneficiary with Hillam Abstracting as Trustee. Tr. Exhibit No.

4

2*

On or about June 3 , .
11 989

request for
bond.

h

ari

the Court granted Loosles'

injunction stopping the sale, sublet*

ii

Loosle failed to pos t t h e required bond
^scheduled and held the foreclosure sale o n

July 2 5 , 1 9 8 9 .
O n October

the Trial Court granted First Federal
ijti i in- I II i uifi 11

II 111 ii deficiency

remaining after t h e foreclosure sale a n d First Federal tiled the
Counterclaim against Loosles,

I ,, |' p. -I B I"1*, 5( -64. •
I ln»

permitting Loosle;

"I i I,I I

I"VH11 I

s

amend their Complaint and to add additional

party Defendants (the realtors and grantors involved in Loosles'

n\

about Marc

redeui

filed

independent action against Loosles (Civil No. 900000129QT) to quiet

property which

subject of i * foreclosure
hearing

*

M

I •* ;

* '

M*

- Court ordered

that
signed the Order April
3'

On Apri]

1990, Loosle? f : < ^

M ^ Amended Complai nt

n a m i n g ciis i.nli I i

*,

Quality Builders Incorporated, and William .
Builders

(hereafter collectively

"Packer

5

;.

acker d/b/a Quali»y
k. ^ p . 1 6 6 - 1 7 4 .

8.

On April 5, 1990, the Box Elder County Sheriff served

Quality Builders, All Pro Real Estate and William L. Packer.

R.

pp. 178-180.
9.

Pursuant

to First Federal's

and Hillam's Motion For

Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Complaint in the misrepresentation,
on May 17, 1990, the Trial Court signed the Order dismissing
Loosles' Amended
Abstracting.
10.

Complaint

against

First

Federal

and

HiiLam

R. pp. 194-199.

On May 21, 1990, Loosles filed their first Notho Of

Appeal in this matter which was dismissed by the Supreme Coui_t on
August 20, 1990.
11.
title

R. pp. 202-203.

After a trial on June 15, 1990 of First Federal's quiet

action,

the

Trial

Court

signed

Findings

Of

Fact

And

Conclusions Of Law and a Judgment And Decree on August 1, 1990
determining all water rights issues between First Federal and
Loosles in First Federal's favor as initially raised in Civil No.
900000129QT.
12.

R. pp. 302-317.

On August 31, 1990, Loosle filed a second Notice Of

Appeal of the Summary Judgment previously appealed and of the quiet
title matters determined August 1, 1990.
13.

R. pp. 324-325.

On October 18, 1990, the Supreme Court dismissed Loosles'

second appeal and on November 5, 1990 remitted the case to the
District Court.
14.

On or about October 29, 1990, Loosles requested Rule

54(b) certification; and on November 7, 1990 the Trial Court signed

6

mi i n 1 in 1 i c 1 i i i ' i 1 a i ni HIM j ni mi ni i
as final

I l:

15.

i: »p

M a y mi , ni in'i mi I

in mi

ni I (in i > mi in, mi i imil

-judgments

333-335.

On November 13, 1990, Loosles filed their third Notice c t

Appeal.

R. pp.
about November 21, 1990, First Federal filed a

Motion *
i n t<

: ismiss the appeal because of *

matters still pending

)istrie

which the Supreme Court denied on December

STATEME||T

QF

g A C T S

In 1980 Loosles owned a home in Perry, Box Elder County,
lit ah.
Loosles contacted realtor Kevin Packer
regarding a home anc

J acres of real property for sale located
i

Ward Property"

nafter mentioned as the "Harper

Property").

Mr. Packer was a neighbor and
I9fl (, »

friend. Marlin Loosle Deposition, 1989 (hereafter "M.Li. Dep
- II

Ii

"' I

i lefeii1!

I'M III" I I in "I i -I I I

• ' ! "\pr±I

I

1990 D e p o s i t i o n J ;• r e f e r e n c e d by 1990)
i-r^i*

price

for

I "Ii I I "I,

After
visits

the

|i

II , II

| ui l lu i'i-

Harper
i

Wara

roperty

was

I 'i

n I j wi-ok period and numerous

•••• Property, Loosles decided to acquire the Harper Ward
mi

H,I 1 11 n i I"

11 I lit

fH|ii i I ,

Perry.

Loosles executed ait Earnest Money Receipt And Offer To Purchase on
September

10, 1980 a**~ -_

..as accepted
7

by

the

exchanging

Seller/Buyer, Quality Builders, Inc. on September 11, 1980. There
was no negotiation of price whatsoever, either of the value of the
home in Perry or of the value placed on the home in Harper Ward.
M.L. Dep«, 1989, p. 14, lines 8-25; p. 22, lines 22-25; p. 23,
lines 1-16; p. 28, lines 20-23.
5.

Loosles previously owned homes in Arizona, Colorado,

Texas, and Perry, Utah, and never dickered or negotiated purchase
or selling prices - they always paid for or sold at the asking
price.
6.

See M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 23, lines 1-17.
Loosles felt their realtors, All-Pro Realty, represented

them in the transaction.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 15, lines 14-17.

Loosles trusted their realtors ("our neighbor and friend", M.L.
Dep., 1989, p. 9, lines 13-16, Jeff Packer and Kevin Packer . . .
"And I felt he (Kevin) was pretty knowledgeable.

And being a

neighbor and going to church with him every week, you know, we
didn't doubt what he was saying was so."

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 15,

lines 23-24.
7c

Plaintiff Marlin Loosle is an aerospace engineer with a

B.S. degree in manufacturing engineering.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 4,

lines 7-8.
8.

Marlin Loosle relied on the real estate people as to the

price being fair when he exchanged his home in Perry.
1989, p. 6, lines 22-23.

M.L. Dep.,

"I relied on them for the value of the

house and the condition of the house and everything."
1989, p. 7, lines 6-7.

8

M.L. Dep.,

9.

&

was what

If was selling

»»

Q. Did yon i believe =•A. Sure.
Q. Did yo
A. Yes.

accept that?

Did you talk about value
other than Kevin or Jeff Packer?
A. No. . ,

Theresa Loosle
Deposit

estimony

: the home with anyone

; almost identical.

(hereafter

Depositioi

*ras worth

Theresa Loosle

1989"

referenced by ig#y

Is referenced by 1990), p. >', lines 4- M .
1

^xchanqe for the Harper Ward Property were

that Loosles would trade
home

* Builders, inc

Perry

Quality Builder

. cosies'

*i •_;

assume the
juie.

Loosles would obtai

secured by

Ward Property, the proceeds of which were

Harper

be paid :< Quality
I 11

Harper Ward Property,

P1.li. Iini

I 111

1989, Dep. Exhibit

Loosles and/or the realtor contacted Paul Petersen, who
hill

ffirvr

fur

Fiiis!

l'""pilrr.il

in

hi i-jltum

(""* 1 I! y

Ill <ili

regarding borrowing the $67,000.00 that Loosles had agreed Lt pay
Lo Quality Builders,

M.I. Dep , 19 89, Depi, Exhibit Nos
"I. I" ill,!!11 i

( i p i H 0 \ i'"I:ii'l

ill'lil I

'
" and »•
t--J< ' l i t i J I

Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed secured by the Harper Ward Property
9

on September 16, 1980 for the benefit of First Federal. M.L. Dep.,
1989, Dep. Exhibit Nos. 5, 8 and 9.
13.

The principal amount of the Note was $67,000.00 with

interest at twelve and three-quarters percent (12-3/4%) per annum
and monthly payments of $728.00. M.L. Dep., 1989, Dep. Exhibit No.
8.
14.

Loosles knew nothing at the time of the September, 1980

closing of an appraisal of the Property done by First Federal in
the sum of $87,000.00 and never saw the appraisal until 1988. M.L.
Dep., 1989, p. 43, lines 1-17.
15.

Loosles made regular monthly payments on the Note and

Trust Deed from October, 1980 through August, 1988.

M.L. Dep.,

1989, p. 61, lines 21-24. In April or May, 1988, Loosles went into
First Federal's Brigham City Office to inquire about refinancing
the Property.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 56, lines 3-7. As part of the

refinancing, First

Federal obtained

an appraisal valuing the

Property as of May 23, 1988 at $63,500.00.
Exhibit No. 3.

M.L. Dep., 1989,

On or about June, 1988, Loosles obtained a second

appraisal on the Property estimating its value as of 1988. M.L.
Dep., 1989, p. 42, lines 1-5.

Shortly after obtaining the 1988

appraisals, Loosles

in their payments

defaulted

on the loan

obligation and a Notice Of Default was filed on February 2, 1989 by
Hillam as Trustee of the Trust Deed.
16.

Tr. Exhibit No. 7.

The Deed of Trust signed by the Loosles, which was

subject of the foreclosure, provided as part of the pledge and
conveyances
10

TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply
such r e n t s ) , royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and
profits, w a t e r . water rights, and water stock, and all
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, aii
of which, including replacements and additions thereto,
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing,
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred
to as the "Property"
Tr Exhibit No 6
]7

The

:.]

was;

water

used

in

connection

a sp ri i 1 ::j :i m m e d :I a t e ] ]
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II

on March 2 3 , 1983, Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin

Thorpe, Vonda

rhorpe^

i i :::: i l R

Ci ir ti s ai i I Barbar a 111?

Ci :i r til s

(neighbors) entered into a verbal and written agreemer* to each pay
:

-

rovide certain labor to joi nt\ v drill a well to

-

..n.*

serve each
well

| 1) parties' homes and real property, the

r«- located on land owned by the Curtises, near each of the

|irt •

ii

l.ousles performed

substantial

installed piping from the wel I. I n the Property,
uccessful
•.,. > ; >:

19-25

and
in

thereafter
7 ?'•

Thomas

1 ?H ? 7 " in | m i I in

lines i I,, p. U,, lines b-i!

11

trenching

and

The well arx

-q

Thorpe

filed

• I

Exhibit N o s ,

Water

19.

On or about January 21, 1982 Thomas C. Thorpe, on behalf

of Loosles, Von R. Curtis and Thomas C. Thorpe, filed Water Right
No. 29-2775 for the use of an underground water well for three (3)
families.

The

Appropriate.

State

Engineer

approved

the

Application

To

While the well right is in the name of Thomas C.

Thorpe, certain other agreements were executed between the parties
reflecting their actual agreement and understanding.

Tr. p. 19,

lines 1-6; p. 37, lines 6-25, Exhibit Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12.
20.

On or about May 18, 1988, Loosles filed a request to

appropriate spring water for irrigation and stockwatering from the
Loosle Spring.

That application had not been acted upon by the

State Engineer at the time of Trial.

Tr. p. 20, lines 14-19,

Exhibit No. 14.
21.

Based on the current plumbing and line connections, the

well water from the Thorpe Well and the spring water from the
Loosle Spring, are the only sources of culinary water to the home.
Tr. p. 52, lines 7-25; pp. 46-49.
22.

The well water has been the sole source of culinary water

utilized in the home since 1982 and is the only acceptable culinary
water source and is critical to the use and value of the Property.
Tr. p. 52, lines 7-25.
23.

First Federal was the successful bidder on the Property

at the Trustee's Sale held July 25, 1989.
24.

Tr. Exhibit No. 23.

The Trustee's Deed to First Federal on the Property and

water rights provided:
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all improvements. rights.
12

appurtenances, r e n t S / royalties# mineral oil and gas
rights and profits, water. water rights and water stock,
and al 1 fixtures now or hereafter attached to the
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed,
without warranty as to title. Tr. Exhibit No. 23.
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I'M
i n,

First Federal argues the statute of limitations bars Loosles
action.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and
Decree entered August 1, 1990 in the quiet title action were
supported by substantial, competent evidence.

R. pp. 302-317.

This evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the Trial
Court's

ruling, establishes

the intent

to have water rights

appurtenant to the Property and pledged to First Federal. Loosles
have failed to marshall the evidence sustaining this Judgment by
the Court and to show that such evidence does not sustain the
Court's Judgment.

Failing so to do, the Judgment of the Trial

Court should be affirmed.
First Federal also requests attorney's fees in defending this
appeal

either

because

of

the

contractual

provisions

of

the

Promissory Note and Trust Deed between Loosles and First Federal or
because of the failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Tr. Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6.

ARGUMENT

I
LOOSLES' BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULES 24(a)(7). 24(a)(9), 24(e), AND
24 (k) BECAUSE IT PROVIDES NO REFERENCE WHATEVER TO THE
TRIAL COURT RECORD AND PROCEEDINGS, AND THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED OR LOOSLES' APPEAL SHOULD BE
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,
Rule 24(a)(7), URAP provides:
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall be supported by citations to the record.
14

xvuxe 24 (a) (!

' R \ 1" provides :

The argument snail contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied o n .
A nd Rul e 2 4 ( e ) , URAP further provi des :
References ,ahii I I In1 made • to tl le pages of Iiii le original
record as jjajxiiiilc J pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement
of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference Is
made to evidence and admissibility of which is in
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of th^
transcript at which the evidence was i denti fied and received or rejected.
Rule 24(k), URAP states:
Brief b vii IIII fh are not in i umpl iance may be
disregarded or sti i '"Ilk n, on motion or sua sponte by the
court, and the coui I IIII ny assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.
I 111

(in

I K I! Il I I

appeal
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Summary of Argument
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unfair
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1

Il

Brinl

t o I he r e c o r d a s t h e b a s i s

i i |i I an i il

iion-comp 1 i a n c o w i t h Ri I 1 oa ? 4 ( a ) ( " ) „
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and makes n moaTiinqful
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First
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s u d d e n l y p r o v i d e numerous c i t a t i o n s
their

III

in t e r m s nt

1 | i ) | 'I | a n d2 4 | i> | I TRAP:

u

ruLerences

I

Ltie r e c o r d ,

NO r e f e r e n c e s

In t h e

record.

Wo r p f e r o n n o n

il 11 I I

i i « 1 1 1 iI I

4.

Argument.

No references to the record.

5.

Conclusion

No references to the record.

The Addendum to the Loosle Brief is neither incorporated by
reference nor cited.

Issues cannot be framed absent reference to

a record that shows certain facts were in evidence and considered
by the Trial Court.

Then the Supreme Court can evaluate the law

and the facts. But absent a showing of where the facts relied upon
are to be found in the record there are no issues. As the Court of
Appeals stated in Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App.,
1991):
Appellants' brief contains . . . no citations to the
record, no legal authorities and no analysis whatsoever.
Their brief is not in compliance with our rules which
require the brief of the appellant to contain an
argument. . . Thus, we decline to address this issue and
assume the correctness of the judgment below. . . At 72.

Further, appellants challenge is that the trial court's
finding is unsupported by the evidence in the record.
But, appellants have failed to marshal the evidence as
required by our standard of review . . . At 73.
The New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with this same issue in
Tofova v. Tofova, 500 P.2d 409 (N.M., 1972), when it specifically
held:
There is not one single reference to a transcript page in
the entire brief in chief and the references to the
transcript wholly fail to comply with the requirements of
Rule 15(6), 16(b) and (16(e), supra. Accordingly, we
will not review the record or consider the claimed errors
relied upon for reversal. At 409. (Citations omitted)
Also see Methola v. County of Eddy, 629 P.2d 350 (N.M. App., 1981).
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They pi epared
of

business.

Affidavit of Paul Petersen.

R. pp. 94-96.

In Dirks v. Cornwell,

754 P.2d 946 (Utah App., 1988), the Utah Appellate Court stated:
We note initially that defendants' brief on appeal fails
to conform to Rule 24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals because there are no citations to the record.
Rule 24(a) requires that each party make a concise
statement of the facts and cite to the pages in the
record where those facts are supported.
We have
previously ruled that if a party fails to adhere to this
rule, "the court will assume the correctness of the
judgment below.
'This Court need not, and will not,
consider any facts not properly cited to, or fsicl
supported by, the record.' "
(quoting Koulis and
Uckerman cases hereafter cited) . . .
We could,
therefore, sua sponte
disregard defendants' brief on
appeal and assume the correctness of the judgment below.
However, we also affirm the trial court's judgment on the
merits. At 947-948.
Since the case involved no issues of fact, the Court dealt
with the merits.

But it appears since Loosles are asking for

consideration of facts in their appeal, the holding of Dirks
regarding a deficient brief means the Trial Court decision should
be affirmed.

In Koulis v. Standard Oil Company of California, 746

P.2d 1182 (Utah App., 1987), the Appellate Court held that, "If a
party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation
of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the
court

will

assume

(Citations omitted)

the

correctness

At 1184.

of

the

judgment

below."

The Loosle Brief is identical in

rule non-compliance with the briefs submitted in the Dirks and
Koulis cases, which mandates the affirmance of the Trial Court.
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah, 1987); Trees v.
Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612-12 (Utah, 1987).

See also White River

Shale Oil Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 700 P.2d 1088, 1089
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the pleadings; which factual issues; where in the 230-plus pages of
Loosles' depositions?
such conclusory

Loosles disclose nothing in their brief but

statements

that make response very difficult

without citation to specifics and to the Record.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Uckerman v. Uckerman, 588
P.2d 142 (Utah, 1978), "This Court need not, and will not, consider
any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." At
144.

This Court should not condone non-compliance with critical,

fundamental rules of appellate procedure. Loosles' failures go to
the very essence of the appellate process of framing issues.

The

Court should affirm the ruling of the Trial Court or the appeal
should be dismissed with prejudice.
II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
FIRST FEDERAL BECAUSE LOOSLES COULD NOT RELY ON FIRST
FEDERAL'S 1980 "IN HOUSE" APPRAISAL, WHEN LOOSLES FIRST
LEARNED OF THE APPRAISAL IN 1988. WHICH APPRAISAL LOOSLES
CLAIM CONSTITUTED THE MISREPRESENTATION,
The Loosles' claim of misrepresentation is totally lacking in
the legal and factual allegations required to establish a cause of
action.

Loosles provide not one shred of evidence that First

Federal misrepresented anything to Loosles and that Loosles relied
upon the same. Loosles state in their Brief, "Appellants (Loosles)
brought this action because they felt they were misrepresented by
the defendant/respondent's
1980."

(First Federal) first appraisal in

Loosle Brief, p. 6, lines 1-3.
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A, THE APPRAISAL PERFORMED BY FIRST FEDERAL WAS FOR
INTERNAL AUDITING PURPOSES ONLY IN MAKING THE LOAN TO THE
LOOSLES; LOOSLES DID NOT KNOW FIRST FEDERAL HAD AN
APPRAISAL IN ITS FILE UNTIL 1988 AND THEREFORE f THE
LOOSLES DID NOT RELY UPON ANY REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN
FIRST FEDERAL'S APPRAISAL.
Loosies allege in their original and Verified Complaint da I i ill
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(1) A, representation;
(2) Concerning a presently exis ting materia ] fact;
(3) which was false;
( I) wh I ch the representor either (a) ki lew to be
•'• false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base si ich
representationsj
(5)
f o r t h e p u r p o s e nl
a c t upon i t ;

indue iity Lho ul h e r p a r try t o

(6) t:l lat the other party, acting reasonably and :i n
i gno ranee of i t s f a1s ity;

(7)
(8)

did in fact rely upon it;
and was thereby induced to act;

(9)

to his injury and damage.

Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah, 1980).
In order for there to be a finding of fraud/misrepresentation
by First Federal, Loosles must demonstrate the existence of ai
nine (9) elements.

Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Ut.ih,

1980); Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah, 1984).

Loosles

assert in their Complaint and Amended Complaint that First Fpderal
made a representation as to the value of the property to them
through the appraisal.
Theresa Loosle relates what First Federal (Paul Petersc i) told
her:
A. Well, he told us that, you know, this was the
selling price for the home.
And he went through the
whole thing with us. This was the selling price, this
was what First Federal was willing to assume, you know,
and go along with us.
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 7, lines 13-17.
Loosles

made

a decision

to

exchange

their

home

in Perry

and

contacted Jeff and Kevin Packer of All-Pro Realty concerning the
exchange.

Jeff

and Kevin Packer

showed

Loosles

the

Property

several times prior to the Loosles deciding to purchase the Harper
Ward Property.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 14, lines 10-23.

The listing

price for the Harper Ward Property was $89,900.00.

M.L. Dep.,

1989, p. 16, line 15.

Mr. and Mrs. Loosle discussed the value of

the Harper Ward Property with Kevin Packer and Jeff Packer and
Packers informed them $89,900.00 was the sale price of the home and
that is what it was worth.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 16, lines 18-20 and
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Clearly, at no time prior to the Earnest Money Agreement being
executed had First Federal or its agents made any representations
to Loosles.

They had no contact with them!

Mr. Loosle has no

recollection of meeting or talking to Mr. Petersen until after
signing the Earnest Money.
Dep.

Exhibit No.

1.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 29, lines 4-10,

Jeff

and Kevin Packer made

the only

representations concerning the value of the Harper Ward Property.
In fact, Plaintiff Marlin K. Loosle acknowledges in his deposition:
Q.
You knew when you went into First Federal
Savings in 1980 to sign the loan documents that you
already had signed a binding, legal contract?
A.

Yes, uh-huh.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 61, line 5.
Thus, a binding, valid contract had been entered into by the
Loosles

to

exchange

the

homes

and

property

prior

to

any

conversations or meetings with First Federal or any of its agents.
When Loosles agreed to exchange the homes and signed the
Earnest Money And Offer To Purchase on September 10, 1980 no
appraisal had been shown to them.

They did not request one. The

Earnest Money was not contingent on any appraisal.
1989, p. 14, lines 16-18.

T.L. Dep.,

The Loosles had merely relied upon the

representations made by Jeff and Kevin Packer and their own opinion
". . .We felt it was a good price". T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 17, line
12.

Therefore, the essential element of a representation being

communicated to the Loosles cannot be met as a matter of fact or as
a matter of law. Loosles' Brief does not argue otherwise. Because
Loosles cannot show a representation by First Federal concerning
the value of the Harper Ward Property prior to them signing their
24
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The only conceivable claim in the entire Record on the Summary
Judgment is that First Federal made a loan and somehow by doing
this they warranted the value of the Property to Loosles.
Q. Do you know if Paul Petersen had ever been on
the property in Harper Ward in 1980 when you closed your
loan, prior to that time?
A. I do not.
Q. Did you make any inquiry of him?
A. No.
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 18, lines 11-16.

(See also h.L. Dep.,

1989, p. 77, lines 1-5.)
Q. Do you have any basis for believing that Paul
Petersen knew that the home was worth or valued at some
figure other than $89,900.00 at the time you closed your
loan?
A. No. I just assumed that he knew that, being he
was making the loan.
T,L. Dep., 1989, p. 18, lines 22-25; p. 19, lines 1-2.
Q. Can you tell me as best you recall exactly what
what [sic] was said in your meeting at First Federal
Savings with Paul Petersen?
A. What was said?
Q. Yes. And what was done?
A. Well, basically he said—
It was like Marlin
said. It was a lot of chit-chat, you know, about buying
the home and he mentioned how, you know, that it sounded
like a great area or whatever.
You know.
Home or
whatever you want to say. Farm. I think most people, or
men maybe I should say, like a lot of area. And so I
think we talked about that a little bit. You know. And
then he proceeded to present us with the papers, and
That's about it.
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 23, lines 8-25.
Q. Did you have any knowledge that there had been
any appraisal of the property, or would be any appraisal
of the property done at the time you closed the loan?
A. No.
T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 24, lines 7-10.
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Loosles provided nothing to the Trial Court to show First
Federal knew or should have known its 1980 appraisal was incorrect.
A 1988 appraisal shows nothing concerning the validity or accuracy
of a 1980 appraisal.

Loosles provided nothing to show the 1980

values placed on the Perry property being exchanged were incorrect.
What if both properties were equally over-priced?
allege

First

property.

Federal

misrepresented

any value

Loosles never
of

the

Perry

First Federal provided an Affidavit of Paul Petersen

stating the appraisal was for "in house" use and was "not performed
for or at the request of the Loosles". R. pp. 94-96. That remains
uncontradicted.

Lenders are not insurers to every borrower of the

value of property. The Findings of Fact attached as Exhibit "A" to
this Brief have inserted in each paragraph the specific support
from the Record.
Loosles' Brief claims, "There is a definite question as to
whether the Defendant (First Federal) negligently misrepresented
the first appraisal for the value of the land." Loosles' Brief, p.
9, line 24.

How could Loosles rely on this?

Loosles signed the

Earnest Money before they ever saw First Federal; they knew nothing
of the "in house" appraisal; they relied on the realtor for the
values of both properties.

(1)

Element

Evidence

Representation

None - never knew of appraisal.

(2) Material Fact

None - no evidence Property worth
less than $89,900.00 exchange price.

(3)

None - Paul Petersen
uncontradicted.

False

28

affidavit

(4) Knew False Recklessly
(5)

Inducing

(6)

Other Party Acting
Reasonably

None.
None - Earnest Money signed before
Loosles saw First Federal and only
purpose for seeing First Federal to obtain a loan.

None - relied on realtor for value
did not dicker.

(7)

Reliance

None.

(8)

Induced to Act

None.

(9) To Injury
and Damage

None.

Even accepting the Loosles' statements as correct, there is no
cause of action.

B.
EVEN IF FIRST FEDERAL HAD MADE FRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS TO LOOSLES, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MUST STAND BECAUSE LOOSLES' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Generally, a statute of limitation runs against any cause of
action when the cause of action comes into being.
Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah, 1975).

Leach v.

A cause of action

arises the moment an action may be maintained to enforce it, and
the statute of limitations is then set in motion.

O'Hair v.

Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (Utah, 1970); Ash v. State, 572 P.2d
1374, 1379 (Utah, 1977).
A complaining party does not have to have actual notice of the
alleged fraud. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182,
1185 (Utah App. 1987). The Utah Court of Appeals stated in Koulis:
29

However, if one is fully informed of such facts and
information as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and
prudence upon inquiry, and one makes no inquiry, then he or
she is deemed to have discovered all that would have been
revealed, and the running of the statute of limitations
commences. At 1185.
See also Gibson v. Jensen, 158 P. 426, 427 (Utah, 1916).
The Utah Supreme Court
defrauded must

said that one who claims to be

exercise reasonable prudence

and diligence in

discovering the fraud and seeking a remedy for it or that party
will be precluded

from doing so.

Bezner v. Continental Dry

Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah, 1976).
Regarding

the

duty

of

an

individual

to

investigate

a

representation the Supreme Court stated:
The one who complains of being injured by such a false
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is
told him, but has a duty of exercising such degree of care to
protect his own interest as would be exercised by an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances; and if
he fails to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to
account for the consequences of his own neglect. Jardine v.
Brunswick Corporation. 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah, 1967).
When parties enter into an arms-length transaction and certain
representations are made then the Utah Supreme Court has held that
where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of
the parties, the complaining party is obligated to take reasonable
steps to inform himself and protect his interests.

Suqarhouse

Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah, 1980).
Loosles apparently took those steps with their realtors and felt
comfortable.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 16, lines 16-24.

Loosles exchanged the property at the listing price.

They

made no effort to negotiate the values placed by the realtor on
30

either home and they did not check with any other real estate
agents, friends or neighbors.

"And so we just took his (Kevin

Packer's) recommendation and his word from that point on."

M.L.

Dep., 1989, p. 60, lines 1-6.
From 1980 through 1988 Loosles received tax notices every year
from the Box Elder County Assessor's Office.
36, lines 17-19.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p.

It is clear from the tax notices that the Box

Elder County Assessor's Office valued the property in 1986 through
1988 at $59,167.00.

First Federal's Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibits D1, D-2 and D-3; R. pp. 97-119.

Furthermore, Marlin Loosle

testified that the tax notices did have some indication as to
valuation on them when he received them.

M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 36,

line 22. However, he did not make any inquiry of anyone regarding
the tax notices and the values that were established.

He simply

complained every year that the taxes seemed to be going up. M.L.
Dep., 1989, p. 36, line 25; p. 37, line 1.
From 1980 through 1988 Loosles were clearly put on notice that
the value of the property may have been lower than the exchange
price.

For example, in an exchange it is possible to exchange

$1,000.00 per bushel apples for $1,000.00 per bushel oranges.
Loosles provided the Trial Court nothing concerning the accurate or
inaccurate value placed on the Perry property which was exchanged
for the Harper Ward Property.
Since the Loosles are claiming misrepresentation, they must
exercise reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering the
31

misrepresentation,
(Utah, 1967).

Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation. 423 P.2d 659

Loosles did not exercise any prudence or diligence

in discovering or in seeking a remedy for the purported wrong.
Their Complaint for fraud/misrepresentation was not filed until
April 24, 1989, over eight and one-half (8-1/2) years after they
acquired the Property by exchange. The statute of limitations for
fraud is as follows:
Within three years:
(3)
mistake;
does not
party of

An action for relief on the ground of fraud or
except that the cause of action in such case
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
the facts constituting the fratid or mistake.

Utah Code Ann., §78-12-26 (1953 as amended).
If Loosles made a bad business decision in 1980, they cannot
shift that burden to First Federal.
Q.
Did you ever ask him (Paul Petersen), "Is the
property worth $89,900.00"?
A. No, I don't recall specifically asking that.
Q. Did you ever ask that of the Packers?
A. I'm not sure. It seemed like we said to Kevin, "Does
that sound reasonable to you?
Is that what we should—"
Because, you know, I wanted the acreage. And as I recall
talking to Kevin, you know, "Does that sound good to you?
Does that sound like that would be a good thing for us?" And
he indicated yes. And so we just took his recommendation and
his word from that point on.
Q. Were you somewhat anxious for the property? Was it
something you'd always wanted and never quite had?
A. In retrospect, I think I probably was more anxious
than was advisable. . .
M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 59, lines 21-25; p. 60, lines 1-10.
Even if one assumes all nine (9) elements of misrepresentation are
met by Loosles, the statute of limitations has long expired and the
right to any claim is extinguished.

32

The Trial Court correctly found no representation, no reliance
and no cause of action for Loosles.

Ill
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY QUIETED TITLE TO CERTAIN WATER
RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF FIRST FEDERAL AND THERE IS ADEQUATE
EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SPRING AND WELL
WATERS WERE APPURTENANT TO THE REAL PROPERTY AND WERE
PLEDGED TO FIRST FEDERAL,
The basic issues at trial were as follows:
1. Are the spring waters to the Loosle Spring and Thorpt

;11

appurtenant to the Property?
2.

If the rights to use of water from the Loosle Sprin^ and

Thorpe Well are appurtenant to the Property, were they pledged to
First Federal by virtue of the Trust Deed executed between Loosles
and First Federal?
The Trial Court, after hearing all the testimony, held that
the waters were appurtenant and were pledged to First Federal
both of these issues basically revolve around the intent of Lhe
parties. The Loosles' Brief does not cite one (1) Finding of Fact
or Conclusion of Law entered by the Trial Court which is not
supported in the record. Loosles made no demand for jury tria* in
this matter, and even if they did, they waived the right to the
same by making no objection at the time of trial.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
part:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially ... Findings of fact, whether
33

based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous ..."
In its decision on the standard of appellate review, Scharf v.
BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
determined the Loosle's burden in order to overcome a trial court's
findings of fact:
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all of the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings.
In Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988), the Supreme
Court provided the nexus between Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Scharf (supra) in the following language:
First, review of findings of fact is controlled by rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. To mount a
successful challenge to trial court findings under this
rule, an appellant must marshal the evidence supporting
the trial court's findings. At 922.
In State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App., 1990), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that "If the appellant fails to so marshal
the evidence, the appellate court need not consider the challenge
to its sufficiency."
Loosles

have

At 738-739.

failed

marshalling requirement.

to meet

or

to

even

undertake

the

In fact, all Loosles have done, at best,

is to argue the Trial Court's conclusions and have not even
suggested there is an inadequate basis in the record.

This does

not begin to meet the marshalling burden Loosles must carry. Under
State v. Moore, supra, this Court need not consider the challenge
of Loosles to the Trial Court's decision.
34

The counter point to Loosles' failure to marshall the evidence
supporting the Trial Court's findings and demonstrate the evidence
failed to support the Trial Court's findings is that the Trial
Court's findings and decision were based on substantial, credible
evidence, and this Court should not invade the Trial Court's
province to assess and weigh that evidence unless the Trial Court
abused its discretion.

The Findings of Fact attached as Exhibit

"D" to this Brief have inserted in each paragraph the specific
support from the Transcript of the Trial for the finding of the
same.
Assuming, arguendo, that Loosles had marshalled the evidence
in favor of the verdict, that evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Court's Judgment, is competent and supports the
Court's Judgment.

In Western Fiberglass. Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie

and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 (Ut. App., 1990), the Court held:
Resolution of a factual dispute is a matter for the jury
as trier of the fact, unless evidence on the issues "so
clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that
reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of the
case."
The Deed of Trust signed by Loosles, which was subject to the
foreclosure, pledged:
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights.
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and
profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all
of which, including replacements and additions thereto,
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing,
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if
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this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred
to as the "Property". Tr. Exhibit No. 6.
When the Loosles purchased the Property in 1980, the Loosle
Spring was the sole source of culinary and irrigation water.

The

Loosle Spring is located on the property immediately in front of
the home. Tr., p. 28, lines 5-16. The Looses subsequently found
that the Spring caused flooding in the basement and that the Spring
water was not good for drinking or cooking when there was a heavy
rain storm or during the summer season when irrigation water was
running through a cement ditch which passes in front of the
Property, between the Spring source and the public highway.

Tr.,

p. 33, lines 12-17; Tr G , p. 34, lines 3-11; Tr., p. 35, lines 1117. Consequently, for some period of time after taking possession
the Loosles hauled water into the home for drinking purposes and
cooking purposes.

Tr., p. 34, lines 16-25.

At the time the

Loosles acquired the Property by exchange and delivered the Trust
Deed to First Federal, no filings with the State Engineer had been
made upon the Loosle Spring.

Tr., p. 28, lines 2-4.

Subsequent to this time, the Thorpes, Curtises and Loosles
agreed to share in the cost of the construction of a well on the
Curtis' property, a nearby neighbor.
Tr. Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10.

This occurred in 1982-83.

While originally designed as a three

(3) family well, it ultimately became a five (5) family well, with
the Loosles owning a proportionate interest (from 1/3 to 1/5) in
the well and the water from it. Mr. Thorpe filed on the well with
the State Engineer's Office for a three (3) family well.
39, lines 7-13.

Mr. Thorpe subsequently
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filed

Tr., p.

for two

(2)

additional families.

Tr., p. 39, lines 14-17.

The well was

completed and hooked up in 1982 or early 1983. Underground piping
was placed from the well to the Loosle home.

Tr., p. 44-45-46.

The well water was piped so that either the well water or the
Spring water could be diverted to be used inside the Loosle home.
Tr., p. 50, lines 3-12. Even though there is simply a valve which
will change the source of water to the home from the well water to
the Spring water, since 1982 the Loosles have solely used the well
water for culinary purposes in the home.

Tr., p. 52, lines 7-25.

The applicable Utah statute appears to be §73-1-11:
A right to the use of water appurtenant to land shall
pass to the grantee of such land, and, in cases where
such right has been exercised in irrigating different
parcels of land at different times, such right shall pass
to the grantee of any parcel of land on which such right
was exercised next preceding the time of the execution of
any conveyance thereof; . . . provided that any such
right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may be
reserved by the grantor in any such conveyance by making
such reservation in express terms in such conveyance
. . . Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)
An after acquired water right passes to an existing lienholder:
Generally, every right or interest held by a mortgagor in
and to the mortgaged property, together with all
SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRED RIGHTS, easements, and privileges
which are necessary and essential to the full enjoyment
of the property, passes with the mortgage . . .
Mortgages, 55 Am,Jur.2d § 803.
The question of whether or not the water is appurtenant to the
land is basically a question of the intent of the parties.
Easements in gross are not favored, however, and a water
right or easement will ordinarily be presumed not to be
in gross where it can fairly construed to be appurtenant
to some other estate. If a water right is in its nature
an appropriate and useful adjunct of the land conveyed,
having in view the intention of the grantee as to its
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use, and there is nothing to show that the parties
intended it to be a mere personal right, it should be
held to be an easement appurtenant to the land, and not
an easement in gross.
Waters, 78 Am.Jur.2d 233.
The Loosles owned the Property at the time the well and Spring
rights were utilized and filed upon; it is clear that the well and
Spring were the only sources of water for the land in question
(Tr., p. 52, lines 7-25); that Loosles were the sole users of the
Spring (Tr., p. 35, lines 18-24, p. 36, lines 5-17); it is also
clear and undisputed that the only land owned by the Loosles in the
area was the Property served by the spring and by the well (Tr., p.
64, lines 14-23), and that Loosles intended the spring and well
rights to be utilized on this Property.

(Ti:., p. 56, lines 1-6;

Tr., p. 58, lines 19-22; Tr., p.66, lines 15-19.) Tr. Exhibit 14.
All of the Loosles' pleadings, affidavits and filings as well as
the testimony at trial suggest that they considered the well,
changes to the spring and use of the water rights to be an
improvement to this Property.

Tr., p. 51, lines 14-17.

If it was

an improvement to this property, it was an appurtenance to it.
Tr., p. 75, lines 6-9.

The fact that Loosles have utilized the

well water since 1982 as the sole source of culinary and domestic
water for this Property, speaks very strongly of their intent.
Tr., p. 52, lines 7-25; p. 53, lines 23-25; p. 55, lines 2-5; p.
74, lines 10-15.

Also, the Application to the State Engineer to

utilize the Spring water solely for irrigation and stockwatering
further demonstrates that Loosles considered the well water the

38

sole source of culinary water for the Property, because it was the
only other water source,

Tr. Exhibit No. 14.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bauer v. Prestwich, 578
P.2d 1283 (1978), "The use of water upon land makes it appurtenant
to that land; and unless it was separately deeded away, it would
pass with the land."

At 1284.

As the Supreme Court of Montana

stated in Adams v. Chilcott, 597 P.2d 1140 (Montana, 1979), "When
a thing is used for the benefit of land, it is deemed appurtenant
to the land ... if the property is transferred without an express
reservation of the appurtenant water rights, they accompany the
land."

At 1145.

The State of Washington holds likewise, as in Foster v.
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 687 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1984) the
Court wrote, "A water right is considered real property which is
appurtenant to and passes with the conveyance of the land which
receives its beneficial use." At 844. Since the rights to use of
the Spring water and well water are appurtenant to the land, they
were pledged to First Federal by virtue of the Trust Deed executed
between the parties.
The only and sole source of culinary drinking water for this
property is the well.

It is not only necessary but essential to

the full and reasonable enjoyment of the Property.
A conveyance of land upon a foreclosure sale must of
necessity - at least, as between the parties to the
mortgage - carry with it a water right appurtenant to the
land, acquired and used by the mortgagor for the benefit
of the land, although obtained after the execution of the
mortgage and before the sale on foreclosure.
Mortgages, 55 Am.Jur.2d § 804.
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The case of Stephens v. Burton, 546 P.2d 240 (Utah, 1976),
specifically upheld the concept of § 73-1-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953,
as amended), "We believe and hold that the water appurtenant to the
two tracts of land conveyed is the amount of water which was
beneficially used thereon before and at the time of the sale." At
241.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Roberts v. Roberts. 584

P.2d 378 (1978), "In Utah, a deed which conveys land to a grantee
also conveys the right to use appurtenant water, unless expressly
reserved.

Appurtenant water is the amount of water beneficially

used on the land before and at the time of the sale."

There is no

dispute that the well water was beneficially used for the domestic
and culinary uses prior to the Trustee's Sale, and that the spring
water was used for irrigation purposes by the Loosles.
There was no reservation of any water rights by the Loosles in
the Trust Deed conveyance and pledge to First Federal. Tr. Exhibit
No. 6.

Furthermore, the water which was appurtenant to the land

and used at the time of the conveyance through the Trustee's Sale
and Trustee's Deed, was the water of the Thorpe Well and Loosle
Spring. Tr. Exhibit No. 23. There was no express reservation made
whatsoever in the Trustee's Deed.
In Salt River Valley Water Users' Association v. Kovacovich,
411 P.2d 201 (Ariz. App. 1966), the Arizona Court of Appeals
specifically held . . .

"a water right is attached to the land on

which it is beneficially used and becomes appurtenant thereto, and
that the right is not in any individual or owner of the land.

It

is in no sense a floating right, nor can the right, once having
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attached to a particular piece of land, be made to do duty to any
other land, with certain exceptions. . •" At 203.
The language of the Deed of Trust is clear and unmistakable,
inasmuch as the conveyance clearly included, "together with all of
the improvements now OR HEREAFTER ERECTED ON THE PROPERTY, AND ALL
. . . WATER, WATER RIGHTS . . . AND ALL FIXTURES NOW OR HEREAFTER
ATTACHED TO THE PROPERTY ALL OF WHICH, INCLUDING REPLACEMENTS AND
ADDITIONS THERETO, SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE AND REMAIN A PART OF THE
PROPERTY COVERED BY THIS DEED OF TRUST . . . "

Also, in the

foreclosure process, the Notice of Default, the Notice of Trustee's
Sale, and the Trustee's Deed, all contain almost the same language.
The Trustee's Deed specifically provided:
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas
rights and profits, water, water rights and water stock,
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed,
without warranty as to title. Tr. Exhibit No. 23.
Whatever rights, title and interest which Loosles had in the well
and in the Spring, were conveyed, transferred and pledged to First
Federal and when foreclosed upon, passed to First Federal as
appurtenances, improvements, and water rights used beneficially in
connection with the Loosle property.
Loosles have not met their burden of showing that the evidence
so clearly preponderates in their favor that reasonable people
would

not

differ

on the

outcome

of

the case.

In Cambelt

International Corporation v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987), the
Supreme Court states:

"We consider the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the verdict, and will not overturn it on appeal when
it is supported by substantial and competent evidence."

At 1242.

The Trial Court Judgment is based on appropriate findings and
the application of such factual findings to the law and should be
affirmed.

IX
FIRST FEDERAL SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
IN RESPONDING TO LOOSLES' APPEAL.
The Promissory Note and Trust Deed executed by Loosles in
favor of First Federal clearly provide for attorney's fees.

Tr.

Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6. The quiet title action stemmed from Loosles'
claim that certain water rights were not pledged to First Federal
and were not owned by First Federal after the Trustee's Sale. The
Trial Court found otherwise.

Since provided by contract, the

attorney's fees incurred by First Federal are recoverable in this
matter.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah,

1988); Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah, 1987).
Furthermore, Rule 24 (k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure clearly provides that the court may charge attorney fees
against Loosles because of the noncompliance with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure in their Brief, as previously described.
In the event the Judgments of the Trial Court in this case are
upheld on this appeal, First Federal respectfully requests that
this Court order the Loosles to pay First Fesderal the attorney's
fees incurred by First Federal on this and the two (2) prior
42

appeals and to remand the issue as to the amount of such attorney's
fees to the Trial Court for determination.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's Judgments or should
dismiss Loosles' Appeal because of Loosles' failure to comply with
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In any event Loosles' attacks

upon the Trial Court's Judgments are without basis in law or in
fact.

Loosles do not attack any of the Trial Court's Findings on

the misrepresentation or on the quiet title action.

This Court

should find that Loosles have not met their burden of marshalling
the evidence and that the Trial Court's decisions are based on
substantial and creditable evidence and are supported in the Record
and Transcript.

In addition, First Federal should be awarded

attorney's fees for the appeal and such other relief as the Court
deems just.

DATED this 18th day of February, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Miles P. Jensen^
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) exact copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellees, to Appellant's Attorney, Dale
M. Dorius, at 29 South Main, P.O. Box U, Brigham City, Utah, 84302,
this 18th day of February, 1992.

Miles P. Jensen
wpd/mpj/ffab/loosle.sta
N-55.159PF
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT "A"

EXHIBIT "A w
Findings of Fact signed May 17, 1990 based on Trial
Memorandum Decision
dated April 4, 1990.
References
to
supporting
each Finding in bold.

Court's
evidence

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Box Elder County, State of
Utah, and were owners of a certain home and real property located
in Box Elder County, State of Utah and more particularly described
as follows:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
(hereafter real property)
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas
rights and profits, water, water rights and water stock,
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed,
without warranty as to title.
2. The Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of
Logan, is a Utah corporation with its place of business in Brigham
City, Box Elder County, Utah.
3. The Defendant, Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency,
Trustee, is a Utah corporation.
4. On or about September 11, 1980 the Plaintiffs entered into
an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase, with All Pro Real
Estate Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and Quality Builders
Incorporated, a Utah corporation, to acquire the real property
described in Finding No. 1. M.L. Dep., 1989, p. 28, lines
10-23.

2

5. On or about the 16th day of September, 1980, Plaintiffs
executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in favor of Defendant,
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, with Hillam
Abstracting and Insurance Agency as Trustee, and said Trust Deed
was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County Recorder, State
of Utah on the 17th day of September, 1980, as Entry No. 80733H in
Book 336 at Page 382; and said Trust Deed Note was secured by the
aforementioned Trust Deed.

M.L.

Dep.,

1989,

p.

53,

lines

9-25.

6. Plaintiffs entered into the Earnest Money Agreement and
Option to Purchase, and agreed on the purchase price and financial
arrangements to purchase the home and real property described in
Findings of Fact No. 1 prior to any involvement or contact with
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan. M.L.
Dep.,
1989, p. 29, lines 2-7; p. 47, line 25; p. 48, lines
1-7.
Plaintiffs did
not rely on Defendants' representations as to the value of said
home and real property described in Finding No. 1. M.L.
Dep.,
1989, p. 59, lines 21-25; p. 60, lines 1-10; T.L. Dep., 1989, p.
10, lines 6-11; p. 23, line 5; p. 9, lines
15-17.
7. An appraisal done by Defendant, First Federal Savings
Association of Logan, on said real property was done by agents of
First Federal for its internal purposes as a matter of documenting
the legitimacy of the loan for their auditors and had no bearing in
the obtaining of the initial transaction which gives rise to this
litigation and Defendants never relied on said appraisal in
purchasing said real property.

M.L.

Dep.,

1989,

p.

43,

lines

10-

13; p. 56, lines 3-7, T.L. Dep., 1989, p. 15, lines 19-22; p. 24,
lines 7-10; Paul Petersen Affidavit,
paragraphs
5-7, R. pp.
94-96.
8. No fiduciary relationship become established between the
Plaintiffs and Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association
of Logan, except as to the handling of money and not in any respect
as to the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint. T.L. Dep.,
1989,
p. 16, line 25; p. 17, lines
1-2.
wpd/mpj/ffab/loosle.fo2

EXHIBIT "B"

EXHIBIT "B"
Miles P. Jensen (#1686)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.0- Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH# IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and THERESA
L. LOOSLE,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, HILLAM
ABSTRACTING AND INSURANCE
AGENCY, Trustee, ALL PRO REAL
ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS
INCORPORATED, a Utah
Corporation, and WILLIAM L.
PACKER dba QUALITY BUILDERS,

Civil No. 89000213CA

Defendants,

N & HOGGAN
RNEYS AT L A W
VEST CENTER
O BOX 5 2 5
M UTAH 8 4 3 2 1
1 ) 7 5 2 1551

)NTON OFFICE
3 EAST MAIN
D BOX 1 1 5

TON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
1) 257 3885

Plaintiffs having made their Motion For Summary Judgment and
the Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association Of Loan
and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance Agency, having replied to the
same, and the Court having reviewed the file and being fully
advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision
dated April 4, 1990, hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Box Elder County, State of
Utah, and were owners of a certain home and real property located
in Box Elder County, State of Utah and more particularly described
as follows:

2
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30M West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30M West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30M East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
(hereafter real property)
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas
rights and profits, water, water rights and water stock,
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed,
without warranty as to title.

) N dc H O G G A N
)PNEYS AT LAW
WEST CENTER
O BOX 5 2 5
VN UTAH 8 4 3 2 1
3 1 ) 7 5 2 1551

ONTON OFFICE
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O BOX 1 1 5
<lTON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
D1)257 3885

2. The Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association
of Logan, is a Utah corporation with its place of business in
Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah.
3. The Defendant, Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency,
Trustee, is a Utah corporation.
4. On or about September 11, 1980 the Plaintiffs entered into
an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase, with All Pro Real
Estate Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and Quality Builders
Incorporated, a Utah corporation, to acquire the real property
described in Finding No. 1.
5. On or about the 16th day of September, 1980, Plaintiffs
executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in favor of Defendant,
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, with Hillam
Abstracting and Insurance Agency as Trustee, and said Trust Deed
was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County Recorder, State
of Utah on the 17th day of September, 1980, as Entry No. 80733H in
Book 336 at Page 382; and said Trust Deed Note was secured by the
aforementioned Trust Deed.
6. Plaintiffs entered into the Earnest Money Agreement and
Option to Purchase, and agreed on the purchase price and financial
arrangements to purchase the home and real property described in

I & HOGGAN
NEYS AT L A W
EST CENTER

BOX 525
UTAH 84321
)752 1551
^TON OFFICE
EAST MAIN

BOX 1 1 5
DN UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
) 257 3885

Findings of Fact No. 1 prior to any involvement or contact with
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan. Plaintiffs did
not rely on Defendants' representations as to the value of said
home and real property described in Finding No. 1.
7. An appraisal done by Defendant, First Federal Savings
Association of Logan, on said real property was done by agents of
First Federal for its internal purposes as a matter of documenting
the legitimacy of the loan for their auditors and had no bearing
in the obtaining of the initial transaction which gives rise to
this litigation and Defendants never relied on said appraisal in
purchasing said real property.
8. No fiduciary relationship become established between the
Plaintiffs and Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association
Of Logan, except as to the handling of money and not in any respect
as to the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The foregoing appear to be uncontroverted facts as to the
elements which would be required to sustain an action based on
fraudulent representation as set forth in the case of Dugan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), and consequently the Plaintiffs
as a matter of law cannot sustain or establish the requisite
elements for their cause of action and, accordingly, Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint
and Amended Complaint and causes of action as against Defendants,
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan and Hillam
Abstracting and Insurance Agency, as Trustee, are dismissed with
prejudice.
2. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be controverted that
there was no reasonable reliance by the Plaintiffs upon any actions
of Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan
or its agents or upon Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency as
Trustee.
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3. The depositions of Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa
L. Loosle are on file with the Court and, pursuant to the request
of Defendants, are accordingly published for purposes of
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment.
DATED this / 7 day of May, 1990.

t. L. Gunnel1,District Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, to Plaintiffs' Attorney,
Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84 302, and to
Quinn D. Hunsaker, Attorney for Defendants, All Pro Real Estate
Incorporated, Quality Builders Incorporated and William L. Packer,
at 102 South 100 West, Brigham City, Utah 84 302, postage prepaid
in Logan, Utah, this 14th day of May, 1990.

Miles P. Jensen
MPJ/2
federal.fof
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Miles P. Jensen (#1686)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O- Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and THERESA
L. LOOSLE,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, HILLAM
ABSTRACTING AND INSURANCE
AGENCY, Trustee, ALL PRO REAL
ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS
INCORPORATED, a Utah
Corporation, and WILLIAM L.
PACKER dba QUALITY BUILDERS,

Civil No. 89000213CA

Defendants.
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(801)752 1551
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Plaintiffs having made its Motion For Summary Judgment, and
the Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association Of Logan
and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance Agency, having replied to the
same, and the Court having reviewed the file and being fully
advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision
dated April 4, 1990 and the Court having previously entered its
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law;
It is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. The Plaintiffs as a matter of law cannot sustain or
establish the requisite elements for its cause of action, which
would be required to sustain an action based on fraudulent
representation as set forth in the case of Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d

2
1239 (Utah 1980), and, accordingly, Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint, Amended Complaint
and causes of action as against Defendants, First Federal Savings
& Loan Association of Logan and Hillara Abstracting and Insurance
Agency, as Trustee, be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2. The depositions of Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa
L. Loosle are on file with the Court and, pursuant to the request
of Defendants, are accordingly published for purposes of
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment.
DATED this / ^ day of May, 1990.
F. L. Gunnell, District Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Order, to Plaintiffs' Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P.
0. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and to Quinn D. Hunsaker,
Attorney for Defendants, All Pro Real Estate Incorporated, Quality
Builders Incorporated and William L. Packer, at 102 South 100 West,
Brigham City, Utah 84302, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this
14th day of May, 1990.

Miles P. Jensen
MPJ/2
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EXHIBIT "D"

EXHIBIT " D w

trial.

Findings
of Fact signed August 1,
References
to evidence supporting

1990 from June 15, 1990
each Finding in bold.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle
(hereafter "Loosles") are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court.
2. Loosles acquired the following described real property
(hereafter the "Property") on September 16, 1980:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
Tr. p.

16, lines

1-7 - Exhibit

No.

4.

3. In connection with their purchase of the Property, on or
about September 16, 1980, the Loosles, for valuable consideration,
made, executed, and delivered to First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Logan (hereafter "FirstFed") that certain Trust Deed
Note dated September 16, 1980 in the principal amount of
$67,000.00. By and through the Note, Loosles agreed to pay to
FirstFed, or its order, the sum of $67,000.00, together with
interest on the unpaid principal balance thereof at the rate of
twelve and three/fourths percent (12.75%) per annum from and after
the date of the Note. Tr. p. 16, lines 12-13 - Exhibit No. 5.
4. To secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the
Note, Loosles made, executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain
Trust Deed dated September 16, 1980 (hereafter "Trust Deed"). The
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County,

Utah, Recorder on September 17, 1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book
336 at Page 382 and pledged the Property. Tr. p. 17, line 1 Exhibit No. 6.
5. The Trust Deed provided as part of the Property pledged:
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights.
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and
profits, water. water rights, and water stock, and all
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all
of which, including replacements and additions thereto,
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing,
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.)
Exhibit

No.

6.

6. The Property consists of 3.12 acres of real property with
a home and outbuildings and is located adjacent to and west of
State Highway 69, about 5 miles North of Brigham City, Utah, in the
"Harper Ward" area of Box Elder County, Utah. Exhibit Nos.
1,2,
3 and 4.
1. The Property has three (3) springs on it - two (2) of
which are north of the home and supply a pond. The springs north
of the home tend to be alkaline and salty and have not been used
for culinary purposes. Tr. p. 29, lines 5-11, 23-24; p. 30,
lines
2-5.
8.
The third spring (hereafter "Loosle Spring") on the
Property is located in front/east of the home. Loosles filed an
Application To Appropriate Water from the Loosle Spring with the
State Engineer on May 18, 1988, which Application has not been
acted upon by the State Engineer. Tr. p. 20, line 14 - Exhibit
14.
9. The Loosle Spring was the only source of culinary water
for the home in 1980 when Loosles acquired the Property and was
also used for irrigation purposes on the Property. Tr. p. 28,
lines
5-16.

10.
The Loosle Spring was piped under the home to the
rear/west side of the home into a pump house and collecting tank
where it could be pumped into the home.
The pump required
electricity to function. The Loosle Spring water could also flow
onto the Property and was used for irrigation purposes by Loosles
from 1980 through August, 1989 when Loosles vacated the Property.
Tr. p.

30,

lines

5-20;

p.

32,

lines

2-10;

p.

33,

lines

2.

11. Within a few days after Loosles moved onto the Property
in 1980 they found the Loosle Spring water unacceptable for
purposes of drinking.

Tr. p.

33,

lines

12-17;

p. 35,

lines

11-17.

Loosles commenced hauling water into the
home for drinking and for some cooking. They would obtain and haul
water from nearby neighbors in containers every two (2) or three
(3) days or sometimes once a week, depending on the season and
amount of water used.

Tr.

p.

34,

lines

16-25.

The Loosle Spring continued to supply water
for household purposes other than drinking. Tr. p. 35, lines
1-10.
12.
The Loosle Spring became contaminated and tasted
"brackish" whenever there was a heavy rain and became contaminated
and tasted "brackish" during each irrigation season (April through
October) when water from a nearby ditch seemed to contaminate the
spring and increase its flow. Tr. p. 34, lines
3-11.
13. In 1982 Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin Thorpe, Vonda
J. Thorpe (hereafter collectively Thorpe), Von R. Curtis and
Barbara F. Curtis (hereafter collectively Curtis) (all neighbors)
entered into a verbal agreement to jointly dig a well on property
owned by the Curtis' to serve each of the three (3) parties' homes
and the interest of the Loosles in the well was for the benefit of
the real property owned by Loosles. The well was dug to the South
and East of the Property and across Highway 69. It consisted of
the well, a pump, pump house, reservoir and one water line to serve
the users. The well drilling was successful and thereafter Thomas
C. Thorpe filed a Water Appropriation No. 57296 (29-2775) claim on
the well with the office of the State Engineer of the State of

Utah. The State Engineer approved the well application for the
use, among others, of three (3) families (domestic plus .25 acres
irrigation per family) on September 17, 1982. Tr. p. 37, lines
625 - Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10.
14. Thorpes, Loosles and Curtis' completed piping of the
water from the well to each of their properties, including the
Property, in late 1982 or early 1983. Tr. pp.
46-49.
15. The well and well water right is now the only water right
available in connection with the Property which is useable yearround for culinary purposes and which is piped underground to serve
the same and the plumbing for the home on the Property is designed
so as to be able to use water from the well. The well water serves
the Property and home by gravity flow and requires no pumping and
no electricity to be used. Tr. p. 46-49; p. 54, lines 19-22; p. 56
lines 1-6; p. 54, lines
19-22.
16. The pipeline from the well is initially a four inch (4")
line covered by a protective casing and is 4-5 feet deep as it goes
West from the well to Highway 69. The line then goes underneath
Highway 69. On the West side of Highway 69 the pipeline splits
into one (1) line to serve Thorpe (further to the West) and one (1)
line to serve the Property (to the North). When it divides to
serve Thorpe and the Property, the line to the Property is a two
inch (2M) line 4-5 feet deep covered by sand and other soil
materials to protect it from damage from rocks. Tr. pp.
46-49.
17. The well pipeline crosses property originally owned by
Curtis for which there is a deeded easement in favor of Loosles
evidenced by that Quit Claim Deed dated July 8, 1986 and recorded
July 8, 1986 in Book 420 at Page 823 in the Office of the Recorder
of Box Elder County, Utah.
The well pipeline then traverses
property owned by Thorpe and for which there was agreement that
Thorpe would give Loosles a written deeded easement, although there
is no evidence such an easement has been executed and delivered.
The well pipeline from the well to the Property and home was dug

with the approval and help of Curtis and Thorpe. Tr. pp. 46-49 Exhibit No. 15.
18. The well pipeline connects to the line to the pumphouse
and to the home on the Property and has a valve system so the well
water can be used in the home and/or to irrigate, and
alternatively, by switching a valve, the Loosle Spring water can be
used in the home and/or to irrigate. Tr. p. 50, lines 3-12; p. 57,
lines
9-11.
19.
Since late 1982 or early 1983 Loosles have not hand
carried water into the home and the well water has been used daily
since then and has been the exclusive source of domestic/culinary
water. Tr. p. 52, lines
7-25.
20. The Loosle Spring, Loosle Spring water rights, spring
pump and pumphouse, spring collecting tank, well, well pipeline,
well pipeline easements, as defined in Finding No. 17, well
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and
attachments to the foregoing are all permanent improvements to the
Property (hereafter collectively referred to as Improvements) . Tr.
p. 53, lines 10-22; p. 61, lines 15-25; p. 66, lines 15-19; p. 69,
lines 12-17.
21. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are
used beneficially in connection with it and are essential and
critical to have the Property and home useable and marketable
without a substantial loss in value. Tr. p. 56, lines
11-23; p.
57, lines 23-25; P. 58, lines 1-5; P. 71, lines 15-23; p. 94,
lines
6-24.
22. The Loosle Spring water and well water and water rights
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are
appurtenant to the Property, are used beneficially in connection
with it and are essential and critical to have a marketable and
useable piece of real property and home. Tr. p. 77, lines
13-16.
Without the Water Rights
and Improvements the home on the Property has no reasonably useable
water for culinary purposes and its value would be substantially

reduced. Tr. p. 60, lines 3-6; p. 61, lines 15-23; p. 74,
lines
10-15; p. 75, lines 5-9; p. 104, lines
6-23.
23. By reason of Loosles' default in one or more of the
installments due under the Note, FirstFed caused a Notice of
Default to be served upon Loosles. The Notice of Default was
recorded in the Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on
February 2, 1989 in Book 469 at Page 541. The Notice of Default
was not cured nor was the obligation and Trust Deed reinstated
within the time allowed by law. Tr. p. 17, lines 10 - Exhibit No.
7.

24.
A Notice of Trustee's Sale dated June 26, 1989 was
prepared and by reason of Loosles' failure to cure or reinstate the
Trust Deed, FirstFed caused a Trustee's Sale to be held on Tuesday,
July 25, 1989 at the Box Elder County Courthouse. Tr. p. 17,
lines
16-17 - Exhibit No. 8.
25. FirstFed, being the highest bidder therefore, bought the
Property secured by the Trust Deed for Sixty-three Thousand Five
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($63,500.00). Tr. p. 21, line 17 Exhibit No. 23; p. 101, lines
5-7.
26.
FirstFed is presently the owner of the following
described real property which they acquired at the Trustee's Sale
on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a foreclosure sale against Loosles,
who were the prior owners of the property:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48 '30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
Tr. p.

21,

lines

17 - Exhibit

No.

23.

27. Loosles claim and assert an interest or ownership in the
Water Rights and Improvements adverse to the claim of FirstFed, and
such claims of Loosles are without any right whatever, and the
Loosles have no estate, right, title or interest whatever in said

Water Rights and Improvements or any part thereof.

lines

Tr.

p.

62,

16-22.

28.
Any claims of Loosles to the Water Rights and
Improvements are void and of no effect because the Water Rights and
Improvements were pledged by Loosles to FirstFed and then acquired
by FirstFed as part of the foreclosure (Trustee's Sale) of the
Property.

Exhibit

Nos.

6,

7', 8 and

23.

29. FirstFed and the Property have a great need and necessity
for the Water Rights and Improvements and any and all rights and
claims of Loosles to Water Rights and Improvements as described are
void and of no effect and title should be quieted in the current
record title owner of the Property, FirstFed. Tr. p. 63, lines 313.

30. Good Water Rights and successful culinary wells are very
difficult to find and obtain in the Harper Ward area of Box Elder
County and there is no city culinary water nearby. Tr. p. 64 -

lines

5-13; p. 105 - lines

2-5.

31. This decision is binding and is a determination of rights
as to the Water Rights and Improvements and other items indicated
as between Loosles and FirstFed and not for any rights as to any
third parties or other parties not before the Court.
32. There were no documents available at the time of
execution of the Trust Deed to further evidence title to the Water
Rights other than as referenced in the Trust Deed.
33. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as: (a) it
applies to improvements on the property either existing or
subsequent; (b) it applies and pledges certain kinds of property
interests which will occur and which need not be directly located
on the Property, such as easements, rights and appurtenances; (c)
it includes water and water rights, which often do occur off of the
property; and (d) it includes fixtures. Exhibit
No. 6.
34. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the

testimony of the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the
foreclosure sale. Exhibit Nos. 6 and 23.
35. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever
severed or used their interest in the Well or water from the Well
on anything but the Property. Tr. p. 56, lines
1-6.
36. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever
severed or used their interest in the Loosle Spring on anything but
the Property. Tr. p. 36, lines
8-17.
37. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. Tr. p.
54, lines 19-25; p. 55, lines 1-25; p. 56, lines
1-6.
38. The Loosles were interested in having two (2) sources of
water to serve the Property, and both sources were pledged to
FirstFed and any and all interest in said Water Rights and
Improvements now belong to FirstFed and are part of the Property.
Tr. p. 46-49; p. 53, lines 10-22; p. 54, lines 19-22; p. 56 lines
1-6, 11-23; p. 57, lines 23-25; P. 58, lines 1-5; p. 61, lines
1525; p. 66, lines 15-19; Tr. p. 69, lines 12-17; P. 71, lines
15-23;
p. 94, lines
6-24.
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EXHIBIT "E"

EXHIBIT "E'

Miles P. Jensen (#1686)
OLSON & HOGGAN
56 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and
THERESA L. LOOSLE,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, ALL PRO
REAL ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah.
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,
and WILLIAM L. PACKER dba QUALITY
BUILDERS,
Defendants.

JLSON a HOGGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

5 6 WES' CENTER
*»0 BCX 5 2 5
LOGAN L'AM 84321
(801)752 1551
"REMONTON OFFICE.
1 2 3 EAST MAIN
*>o BOX 1 1 5
EMONTOS UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
(801J257 3885

Civil No. 890000213CA

This matter came on for hearing at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on
Friday, June 15, 1990, in the Court Room in the County Courthouse
at Brigham, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell
presiding. The matter in issue was Defendant First Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Logan's Complaint dated March 8, 1990,
originally filed as Civil No. 900000129, now consolidated with
Civil No. 890000213CA. The Plaintiffs were present in person and
were represented by their counsel, Dale M. Dorius, and Defendant,
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, was present and
represented by its counsel, Olson & Hoggan, Miles P. Jensen, and
the parties having called certain witnesses, introduced certain
exhibits, and having made certain arguments to the Court, and the
Court being fully advised in the matter, and having heard the
Case No.
j PHOTO COPY OF
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199C

testimony, reviewed the exhibits and other documents on file, and
having issued its oral decision from the Bench, the Court hereby
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Looale
(hereafter "Loosles") are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court.
2. Loosles acquired the following described real property
(hereafter the "Property") on September 16, 1980:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30* East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30H East 603 feet to the point of beginning.

SON & HOGGAN
TTO**»»E«S A - LAW
5 6 WES" CENTER

PO 5C» 525
DGAN _-*<« 8 * 3 2 1

<8Cm~52 1551
E M O f T C ^ OFFICE
123 £*i*

3. In connection with their purchase of the Property, on or
about September 16, 1980, the Loosles, for valuable consideration,
made, executed, and delivered to First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Logan (hereafter "FirstFed") that certain Trust Deed
Note dated September 16, 1980 in the principal amount of
$67,000.00. By and through the Note, Loosles agreed to pay to
FirstFed, or its order, the sum of $67,000.00, together with
interest on the unpaid principal balance thereof at the rate of
twelve and three/fourths percent (12.75%) per annum from and after
the date of the Note.
4. To secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the
Note, Loosles made, executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain
Trust Deed dated September 16, 1980 (hereafter "Trust Deed"). The
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County,
Utah, Recorder on September 17, 1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book
336 at Page 382 and pledged the Property.
5. The Trust Deed provided as part of the Property pledged:

MAIN
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TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights,

appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and
profits, water, water rightsf and water stock, and all
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all
of which, including replacements and additions thereto,
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing,
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.)
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6. The Property consists of 3.12 acres of real property with
a home and outbuildings and is located adjacent to and west of
State Highway 69, about 5 miles North of Brigham City, Utah, in the
-Harper Ward" area of Box Elder County, Utah.
7. The Property has three (3) springs on it - two (2) of
which are north of the home and supply a pond. The springs north
of the home tend to be alkaline and salty and have not been used
for culinary purposes.
8.
The third spring (hereafter "Loosle Spring") on the
Property is located in front/east of the home. Loosles filed an
Application To Appropriate Water from the Loosle Spring with the
State Engineer on May 18, 1988, which Application has not been
acted upon by the State Engineer.
9. The Loosle Spring was the only source of culinary water
for the home in 1980 when Loosles acquired the Property and was
also used for irrigation purposes on the Property.
10.
The Loosle Spring was piped under the home to the
rear/west side of the home into a pump house and collecting tank
where it could be pumped into the home.
The pump required
electricity to function. The Loosle Spring water could also flow
onto the Property and was used for irrigation purposes by Loosles
from 1980 through August, 1989 when Loosles vacated the Property.
11. Within a few days after Loosles moved onto the Property
in 1980 they found the Loosle Spring water unacceptable for
purposes of drinking. Loosles commenced hauling water into the
home for drinking and for some cooking. They would obtain and haul

water from nearby neighbors in containers every two (2) or three
(3) days or sometimes once a week, depending on the season and
amount of water used. The Loosle Spring continued to supply water
for household purposes other than drinking.
12.
The Loosle Spring became contaminated and tasted
H
"brackish whenever there was a heavy rain and became contaminated
and tasted "brackishH during each irrigation season (April through
October) when water from a nearby ditch seemed to contaminate the
spring and increase its flow.
13. In 1982 Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin Thorpe, Vonda
J. Thorpe (hereafter collectively Thorpe), Von R. Curtis and
Barbara F. Curtis (hereafter collectively Curtis) (all neighbors)
entered into a verbal agreement to jointly dig a well on property
owned by the Curtis' to serve each of the three (3) parties' homes
and the interest of the Loosles in the well was for the benefit of
the real property owned by Loosles. The well was dug to the South
*
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and East of the Property and across Highway 69. It consisted of
the well, a pump, pump house, reservoir and one water line to serve
the users. The well drilling was successful and thereafter Thomas
C. Thorpe filed a Water Appropriation No. 57296 (29-2775) claim on
the well with the office of the State Engineer of the State of
Utah. The State Engineer approved the well application for the
use, among others, of three (3) families (domestic plus .25 acres
irrigation per family) on September 17, 1982.
14. Thorpes, Loosles and Curtis' completed piping of the
water from the well to each of their properties, including the
Property, in late 1982 or early 1983.
15. The well and well water right is now the only water right
available in connection with the Property which is useable yearround for culinary purposes and which is piped underground to serve
the same and the plumbing for the home on the Property is designed
so as to be able to use water from the well. The well water serves
the Property and home by gravity flow and requires no pumping and
no electricity to be used.

16. The pipeline from the well is initially a four inch (4M)
line covered by a protective casing and is 4-5 feet deep as it goes
West from the well to Highway 69. The line then goes underneath
Highway 69. On the West side of Highway 69 the pipeline splits
into one (1) line to serve Thorpe (further to the West) and one (1)
line to serve the Property (to the North) . When it divides to
serve Thorpe and the Property, the line to the Property is a two
inch (2") line 4-5 feet deep covered by sand and other soil
materials to protect it from damage from rocks.
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17. The well pipeline crosses property originally owned by
Curtis for which there is a deeded easement in favor of Loosles
evidenced by that Quit Claim Deed dated July 8, 1986 and recorded
July 8, 1986 in Book 420 at Page 823 in the Office of the Recorder
of Box Elder County, Utah.
The well pipeline then traverses
property owned by Thorpe and for which there was agreement that
Thorpe would give Loosles a written deeded easement, although there
is no evidence such an easement has been executed and delivered.
The well pipeline from the well to the Property and home was dug
with the approval and help of Curtis and Thorpe.
18. The well pipeline connects to the line to the pumphouse
and to the home on the Property and has a valve system so the well
water can be used in the home and/or to irrigate, and
alternatively, by switching a valve, the Loosle Spring water can
be used in the home and/or to irrigate.
19. Since late 1982 or early 1983 Loosles have not hand
carried water into the home and the well water has been used daily
since then and has been the exclusive source of domestic/culinary
water.
20. The Loosle Spring, Loosle Spring water rights, spring
pump and pumphouse, spring collecting tank, well, well pipeline,
well pipeline easements, as defined in Finding No. 17, well
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and
attachments to the foregoing are all permanent improvements to the
Property (hereafter collectively referred to as Improvements).
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21 • The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are
used beneficially in connection with it and are essential and
critical to have the Property and home useable and marketable
without a substantial loss in value.
22. The Loosle Spring water and well water and water rights
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are
appurtenant to the Propertyf are used beneficially in connection
with it and are essential and critical to have a marketable and
useable piece of real property and home. Without the Water Rights
and Improvements the home on the Property has no reasonably useable
water for culinary purposes and its value would be substantially
reduced.
23. By reason of Loosles' default in one or more of the
installments due under the Note, FirstFed caused a Notice of
Default to be served upon Loosles. The Notice of Default was
recorded in the Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on
February 2, 1989 in Book 469 at Page 541. The Notice of Default
was not cured nor was the obligation and Trust Deed reinstated
within the time allowed by law.
24. A Notice of Trustee's Sale dated June 26, 1989 was
prepared and by reason of Loosles' failure to cure or reinstate the
Trust Deed, FirstFed caused a Trustee's Sale to be held on Tuesday,
July 25, 1989 at the Box Elder County Courthouse.
25. FirstFed, being the highest bidder therefore, bought the
Property secured by the Trust Deed for Sixty-three Thousand Five
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($63,500.00).
26.
FirstFed is presently the owner of the following
described real property which they acquired at the Trustee's Sale
on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a foreclosure sale against Loosles,
who were the prior owners of the property:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30M East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48' 30" West 603

feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
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27. Loosles claim and assert an interest or ownership in the
Water Rights and Improvements adverse to the claim of FirstFed, and
such claims of Loosles are without any right whatever, and the
Loosles have no estate, right, title or interest whatever in said
Water Rights and Improvements or any part thereof.
28.
Any claims of Loosles to the Water Rights and
Improvements are void and of no effect because the Water Rights and
Improvements were pledged by Loosles to FirstFed and then acquired
by FirstFed as part of the foreclosure (Trustee's Sale) of the
Property.
29. FirstFed and the Property have a great need and necessity
for the Water Rights and Improvements and any and all rights and
claims of Loosles to Water Rights and Improvements as described are
void and of no effect and title should be quieted in the current
record title owner of the Property, FirstFed.
30. Good Water Rights and successful culinary wells are very
difficult to find and obtain in the Harper Ward area of Box Elder
County and there is no city culinary water nearby.
31. This decision is binding and is a determination of rights
as to the Water Rights and Improvements ajnd other items indicated
as between Loosles and FirstFed and not for any rights as to any
third parties or other parties not before the Court.
32. There were no documents available at the time of
execution of the Trust Deed to further evidence title to the Water
Rights other than as referenced in the Trust Deed.
33. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as:
(a) it
applies to improvements on the property either existing or
subsequent; (b) it applies and pledges certain kinds of property
interests which will occur and which need not be directly located
on the Property, such as easements, rights and appurtenances; (c)

8

50N & HOGGAN
TORNE^S *"* w*W
)6 WES" C £ V - T S

POBC" 525
GAN U - A - 5^321
(801)752 1551
:MONfTONO^ncE.
123 E*5PO

WA.»S

er » i ' 5

O N T O - . - " * - 9-4337

801)25? 3*85

it includes water and water rights, which often do occur off of the
property; and (d) it includes fixtures.
34. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the
testimony of the parties and exhibits# as to the intentions of the
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the
foreclosure sale.
35. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever
severed or used their interest in the Well or water from the Well
on anything but the Property.
36. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever
severed or used their interest in the Loosle Spring on anything but
the Property.
37. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed.
38. The Loosles were interested in having two (2) sources of
water to serve the Property, and both sources were pledged to
FirstFed and any and all interest in said Water Rights and
Improvements now belong to FirstFed and are part of the Property.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan
(hereafter FirstFed) is presently the owner of the following
described real property (hereafter the Property) which they
acquired at the Trustee's Sale on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a

foreclosure sale against Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle
(hereafter Loosles), who were the prior owners of the Property:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North# Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30M West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30H East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
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2. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as it applies to
improvements on the property either existing or subsequent;
inasmuch as it applies and pledges certain kinds of property
interests which will occur and not be located on the Property, such
as easements, rights and appurtenances; it includes water and water
rights, which often do occur adjacent to or nearby the Property and
for fixtures.
3. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest then and now of the
Loosles in and to the Loosle Spring (including but not limited to
the Application To Appropriate dated May 18, 1988, Application No.
A63206) and in any documents evidencing any right, title, interest
or claim is owned by and vested in FirstFed.
4. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest of Loosles in the
well, well water, easements and improvements (including but not
limited to rights to use of a share of the well under Appropriation
No. 57296 (29-2775) and in any documents evidencing any right,
title, interest or claim in said well, well water, easements and
improvements is owned by and vested in FirstFed.
5. The Loosles' sole reason for the Well, easements and the
improvements to the water system and the establishment of the Well
water rights was for the improvement and benefit of the Property.
6.
The Loosle Spring, spring pump and pumphouse, spring
collecting tank, well, well pipeline, well pipeline easements, well

10
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and
improvements and attachments to the foregoing are all permanent
improvements to the Property (hereafter collectively referred to
as Improvements).
7. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are used
beneficially in connection with it and are essential and critical
to have the Property and home useable and marketable without a
substantial loss in value.
8.
The Loosle Spring water and well water (hereafter
collectively referred to as "Water Rights") "are appurtenant to the |
Property, are used beneficially in connection with it and are
essential and critical to the use and marketing of the Property I
and home. Without the Water Rights and Improvements the home on
the Property has no reasonably useable water for culinary purposes
and its value would be substantially reduced.
9. Any and all rights and claims of Loosles to Water Rights j
and Improvements as described are null and void and of no effect
and title should be quieted in the current record title owner of i
the Property, FirstFed.
j
10. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as I
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the j
testimony of the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and \
i

after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and •.
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and !
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the j
foreclosure sale.
I
11. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the I
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for j
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvernent i
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed.
j
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12. The claims, right, title and interest of FirstFed in and
to said Water Rights and Improvements is superior, free and clear
of any title or claim of Loosles and all claims of Loosles are null
and void and Loosles should be decreed to have no estate in,
interest in, lien or encumbrance upon or right of use or sale of
said Water Rights and Improvements.
13. Loosles should be forever barred, enjoined and restrained
from making or asserting any claim or interest in or to FirstFed's
Water Rights and Improvements or clouding any portion thereof or
in any way questioning, disturbing or attempting to disturb or
interfere with the referenced Water Rights and Improvements.
DONE in open Court this 15th day of June, 1990 and signed in
open Court this
/ day of .Juiffil 1990.

<LJ±

FT'L. Gunnel 1
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered an exact copy of the
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law to Plaintiffs'
Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, 29 South Main Street,
Brigham City, Utah 84302, this 16th day of July, 1990.
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EXHIBIT "F

EXHIBIT "F"

Miles P. Jensen (#1686)
OLSON & HOGGAN
56 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and
THERESA L. LOOSLE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, ALL PRO
REAL ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah.
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,
and WILLIAM L. PACKER dba QUALITY
BUILDERS,
Defendants.
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JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Civil No. 890000213CA

This matter came on for hearing at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on
Friday, June 15, 1990, in the Court Room in the County Courthouse
at Brigham, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell
presiding. The matter in issue was Defendant First Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Logan's Complaint dated March 8, 1990,
originally filed as Civil No. 900000129, now consolidated with
Civil No. 890000213CA. The Plaintiffs were present in person and
were represented by their counsel, Dale M. Dorius, and Defendant,
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, was present and
represented by its counsel, Olson & Hoggan, Miles P. Jensen, and
the parties having called certain witnesses, introduced certain
exhibits, and having made certain arguments to the Court, and the
Court being fully advised in the matter, and having heard the
M I C R O F 11 M E D
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testimony, reviewed the exhibits and other documents on file, and
having issued its oral decision from the Bench, and having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the Court hereby makes the following:
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.
First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan
(hereafter FirstFed) is presently the owner of the following
described real property (hereafter the Property) which they
acquired at a Trustee's Sale on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a Trust
Deed foreclosure against Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle
(hereafter Loosles), who were the prior owners of the Property:
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast -corner of
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'SO" East along said
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603
feet, thence North 1*27'30H West 225.5 feet, thence North
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning.
2. Pursuant to a loan from FirstFed to Loosles, Loosles made,
executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain Trust Deed dated
September 16, 1980 (hereafter Trust Deed) and recorded in the
Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on September 17,
1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book 336 at Page 382 which Trust Deed
was the basis for the foreclosure and Trustee's Sale above
described and which Trust Deed pledged:
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TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances. rents (subject however to the rights and
authorities given herein to Lender to coalleet and apply
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and
profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all
of which, including replacements and additions thereto,
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing,
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.)

3.
The language of the Trust Deed cited in paragraph 2
applies to improvements on the property either existing or
subsequent; applies and pledges certain kinds of property interests
which will occur and not be located on the Property, such as
easements, rights and appurtenances - includes water and water
rights, which often do occur adjacent to or nearby the Property and
includes fixtures.
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4. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest then and now of the
Loosles in and to the Loosle Spring (including but not limited to
the Application To Appropriate dated May 18, 1988, Application No.
A63206) and in any documents evidencing any right, title, interest
or claim is owned by and vested in FirstFed.
5. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest of Loosles in the
well, well water, easements and improvements (including but not
limited to rights to use of a share of the well under Appropriation
No, 57296 (29-2775) and in any documents evidencing any right,
title, interest or claim in said well, well water, easements and
improvements is owned by and vested in FirstFed.
6. The Loosles' sole reason for the Well, easements and the
improvements to the water system and the establishment of the Well
water rights was for the improvement and benefit of the Property.
7.
The Loosle Spring, spring pump and pumphouse, spring
collecting tank, well, well pipeline, well pipeline easements, well
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and
improvements and attachments to the foregoing are all permanent
improvements to the Property (hereafter collectively referred to
as Improvements).
8. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are used
beneficially in connection with it and are essential and critical
to have the Property and home useable and marketable without a
substantial loss in value.
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9.
The Loosle Spring water and well water (hereafter
collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are appurtenant to the
Property, are used beneficially in connection with it and are
essential and critical to the use and marketing of the Property and
home. Without the Water Rights and Improvements the home on the
Property has no reasonably useable water for culinary purposes and
its value would be substantially reduced.
10. Any and all rights and claims of Loosles to Water Rights
and Improvements as described are null and void and of no effect
and title is hereby quieted in the current record title owner of
the Property, FirstFed.
11. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as
interpreted and applied to this case and based on the testimony of
the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the Loosles,
indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are covered by the
language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title and interest
of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and any and all after
acquired right, title and interest of the Loosles in and to Water
Rights and Improvements and any documents evidencing that right,
title and interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase
at the Trustee's Sale described in paragraph 1, above.
12. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed.
13. The claims, right, title and interest of FirstFed in and
to said Water Rights and Improvements is superior, free and clear
of any title or claim of Loosles and all claims of Loosles are null
and void and Loosles are hereby decreed to have no estate in,
interest in, lien or encumbrance upon or right of use or sale of
said Water Rights and Improvements•
14. Loosles are forever barred, enjoined and restrained from
making or asserting any claim or interest in or to FirstFed's Water
Rights and Improvements or clouding any portion thereof or in any

way questioning, disturbing or attempting to disturb or interfere
with the referenced Water Rights and Improvements.
DONE in open Court the 15th day of June, 1990 and signed this
l_ day of Jtt¥r^< 1990.

F. L. Bunnell
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered an exact copy of the
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law to Plaintiffs'
Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, 29 South Main Street,
Brigham City, Utah 84302, this 16th day of July, 1990.
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